24日の日経記事にジョージ・ソロス氏のインタビュー。 市場で好き勝手やっといてそれはないだろう（怒り）。
ー金融市場と景気の現状をどう見ますか。
「（世界恐慌後の）1930年代以来、最悪の金融市場だ。悲観的に見ていた私の見通しをも上回る厳しさである。当局は安定化製作をとり、銀行間の取引金利はやや落ち着いたが、ほかの市場は混乱が続いたままだ」
ー投資家であるヘッジファンドの行方は。
「ファンド全体で運用資産の20％かそれ以上、たぶん25％の損失を被り、解約の圧力に圧縮している。このままいけば運用資産規模は少なくとも半減する。四分の三減ってもおかしくない」
ー金融当局の対応をどうみますか。
「資産バブルを制御するのは当局の責任だ。だがグリーンスパン、バーナンキの量米連邦準備理事会（ＦＲＢ）議長はインフレには責任を負うが、資産バブルに対する責任については明白に拒否してきた。金融当局は信用の増減や資産価格の動きに目を配るべきだ。」
ー資産価格を制御する政策手段は。
「マネーサプライ（通貨供給量）や金利の調節では十分ではない。株式取引の担保の掛け目や必要な最低資本の管理と言った手段も活用すべきだ。バブルが膨らむと強気心理が蔓延するので、担保の評価を下げるなどしてブレーキをかける。バブルが崩壊し弱気になっている時には緩和する対応が必要だ」
ーファンド規制論も出ています。
「ファンドは借り入れなど信用を元手に活動する。信用は制御されるべきだ。従ってファンドも規制される必要がある。リスクの高いファンドへの融資には、より多くの準備金を積ませる、という形で、銀行を通じて規制することが可能だ」
ー政府は市場に対してどう臨むべきですか。
「政府の介入なしには市場が崩壊してしまう局面にある。市場は政府の積極的な介入を必要としている。オバマ次期大統領が言っているのもそんなところだ。ポールソン財務長官は場当たり的で、常に後手に回っていた。オバマ政権はもっと一貫性のあるものになると予想している」
ーオバマ政権は大きな政府になるのでは。
「政府の役割が大きくなるのは避けられない。民間需要が無い現状では、政府だけが有効需要を創造できる。財政赤字は増加するだろう。FRBの資産規模も増大する。マネーの供給を増やしてもし信用乗数が落ち込んでいるので、信用収縮を食い止めるのは難しい。円を除く通過に対してドルがむしろ堅調なのは、米国の信用が収縮しているからだ」
ービッグスリーの救済論儀については。
「今のままの経営形態で再建できるかどうか疑問だ。公的資金で救済する道理はない」
ー銀行システムも揺らいでいます。
「銀行への公的資金の注入は正しい選択だし、私は早くからそう指摘してきた。日本の銀行危機が10年間も長引いたのは、銀行が不良債権をバランスシートに抱え込むことが許されたからだ。今また米国の銀行が保有資産を時価で洗い替えせずに、満期まで保有することが容認されれば、同じ道をたどる。金融機関は評価損の計上を急ぎ、資本を増強する必要がある」
（ニューヨーク 滝田洋一）
他方で、20日のEconomistに見られるアメリカ楽観主義も厳然として存在します。アメリカという国は、確かに産学によるインキュベーションと、先進市場の近接により発展モデルを形成してきたが、テクノロジーと市場は確実に中国に食われつつあります。Venturesome companyを高らかに唄ったとしても、それを補う唯一の材料は「フロンティア・スピリット」と「アメリカン・ドリーム」でしかない。中国にモラルが整備された際に、本当にアメリカの競争力は地に落ちるのかも知れません。。
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Venturesome America A gathering storm?
Nov 20th 2008 | NEW YORK
From The Economist print edition
So does the relative decline of America as a technology powerhouse really amount to a threat to its prosperity? Nonsense, insists Amar Bhidé of Columbia Business School. In "The Venturesome Economy", a provocative new book, he explains why he thinks this gloomy thesis misunderstands innovation in several fundamental ways.
First, he argues that the obsession with the number of doctorates and technical graduates is misplaced because the "high-level" inventions and ideas such boffins come up with travel easily across national borders. Even if China spends a fortune to train more scientists, it cannot prevent America from capitalising on their inventions with better business models.
That points to his next insight, that the commercialisation, diffusion and use of inventions is of more value to companies and societies than the initial bright spark. America's sophisticated marketing, distribution, sales and customer-service systems have long given it a decisive advantage over rivals, such as Japan in the 1980s, that began to catch up with its technological prowess. For America to retain this sort of edge, then, what the country needs is better MBAs, not more PhDs.
America also has another advantage: the extraordinary willingness of its consumers to try new things. Mr Bhidé insists that such "venturesome consumption" is a vital counterpart to the country's entrepreneurial business culture.
Is he right? The lack of long-term data means this has become "a quasi-theological dispute", says Robert Litan of the Kauffman Foundation, a charity that provided some funding for Mr Bhidé's work. But the contrarian should not be dismissed out of hand. For a start, he is right to argue against making a fetish of invention. Edison did not invent the light bulb and Ford did not think up the motor car, but both came up with the business-model innovations required to
profit from those marvels.
And as GE's Mr Immelt likes to say, his firm is not great at invention, but it is outstanding at "turning $50m businesses into billion-dollar businesses". Adam Segal of the Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank, points out that the sensors that America's soldiers use are no longer secret technology, but they use them in sophisticated ways that rivals cannot copy easily.
There is another reason to take the current "techno-nationalism", as Mr Bhidé calls it, with a grain of salt. Even if China and India really are surging ahead in the number of technical graduates (and research by Vivek Wadhwa of Harvard University casts doubt on the quality of many of those degrees), innovation is not a zero-sum game. On the contrary, there is growing evidence that the rise of the giant emerging economies may even help those companies from the rich world that take a global approach to innovation.
For several years Booz & Company, a management consultancy, has compiled a ranking, called the Global Innovation 1000, of the world's leading firms ranked by investment in research and development. It has shown in the past that spending more on research has no correlation with better financial performance. But this year's study, recently released, found that multinational firms that took a global approach to research outperformed those that concentrated their research spending in their home market.
Why? "Being global and open is now necessary for innovation," says Henry Chesbrough of the University of California, Berkeley. Cost is only one reason (and not usually the main one, Booz argues) to have a global research presence. Another advantage is the ability to tap into pools of talent abroad. But the most important advantage is the ability to listen to, and learn from, customers in new markets.
As well as helping designers come up with products relevant to those markets, it also allows innovation to flow the other way. Indians often share mobile phones, notes Stephen Johnston of Nokia, so the handset-maker developed software to allow multiple phone-books on a single handset; this idea is now being brought to Western markets so that users can, say, separate their home and work contacts. Similarly, GE has developed low-cost medical scanners for Asian markets that are now being sold in other poor countries, too.
Clayton Christensen of Harvard Business School is not fully persuaded by the arguments put forth by Mr Bhidé (who happens to be a former classmate). He thinks Chinese and Indian firms may in time "disrupt" established American companies just as personal computers challenged mainframes, and he worries about America's education system. But he accepts Mr Bhidé's notion that it is more useful to teach technical skills to managers and factory workers than merely to crank out more theoretical scientists.
Most importantly, Mr Christensen agrees with Mr Bhidé that there is no case for protectionism. Some techno-nationalists argue, for instance, that "American innovation" should receive preferential tax treatment or subsidies. Such proposals make little sense given the increasingly global and open nature of innovation. As Mr Chesbrough wryly puts it: "What's good for Intel may not necessarily be good for America."
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